Whitehead, prehension, panexperientialism and process theology, including the public exchange with Matthew David Segall.
A reductio of the post-erratum rebuttal: I subtract no evidenced experience. My D+?X retains the process-relational and experiential commitments the evidence already supports.
What I Said Matt Said, What Matt Says I Said Matt Said, What the Sources Say We Actually Said, and Whatever Survived the Context Shredder
Why his revised argument still burdens my agnosticism with a position he admitted I did not hold, while the page remains partly repaired and his readers remain uncorrected.
He acknowledged the misattribution, but the original article remains uncorrected, the dependent critique unrevised, and the questions I actually asked still unanswered.
Matt admits he collapsed my conditional argument and agnosticism into a position I never held. What remains of the critique built against it?
The live disagreement is much narrower: whether causal actuality itself warrants a universal experiential or affective characterization, or whether primitive intrinsic character should remain open until something discriminates that interpretation from its strongest process-relational rivals.
What Erik Svensson, Massimo Pigliucci, and Matthew David Segall reveal about the evidence for physicalism, the residual case for panexperientialism, and what each would have to do to progress.
Matthew David Segall, Karsten Jensen, and Jason Hoskins on science, philosophy, religion, consciousness, and what it takes for our ideas about reality to be wrong.