Essays on truth, evidence, representation, reasoning, correction, underdetermination, and the methods of naturalized epistemology.
What does truth require when an opponent publicly substitutes a position you did not hold? An evidence-led examination of Segall, representation, ontology, and the burden of argument.
An introduction to Provisional, Boundary- and Scale-Relative Realism, its evidential commitments, rival models, and the limits of claims about ultimate ontology.
A critical self-audit of Thermodynamic Monism: what follows from thermodynamic constraints, what remains metaphysical conjecture, and which claims need revision.
Phenomenal powers, prehension, and a transport test for Whitehead’s universal wager
A reply to Matthew David Segall on continuity, comparative warrant, and universal prehension.
How a protective interpretive frame can turn compatibility into apparent confirmation, and why the bridge from shared causal reality to universal prehensive feeling still needs its own warrant.
A reductio of the post-erratum rebuttal: I subtract no evidenced experience. My D+?X retains the process-relational and experiential commitments the evidence already supports.
My Public Debate with Aron Ra about Naturalistic Explanation and the God Claims Biblical Debunking Leaves Open
What I Said Matt Said, What Matt Says I Said Matt Said, What the Sources Say We Actually Said, and Whatever Survived the Context Shredder
Why his revised argument still burdens my agnosticism with a position he admitted I did not hold, while the page remains partly repaired and his readers remain uncorrected.
He acknowledged the misattribution, but the original article remains uncorrected, the dependent critique unrevised, and the questions I actually asked still unanswered.
Matt admits he collapsed my conditional argument and agnosticism into a position I never held. What remains of the critique built against it?