Cases where observations constrain several serious interpretations without uniquely supporting one stronger intrinsic or universal ontology.
A reductio of the post-erratum rebuttal: I subtract no evidenced experience. My D+?X retains the process-relational and experiential commitments the evidence already supports.
What I Said Matt Said, What Matt Says I Said Matt Said, What the Sources Say We Actually Said, and Whatever Survived the Context Shredder
Why his revised argument still burdens my agnosticism with a position he admitted I did not hold, while the page remains partly repaired and his readers remain uncorrected.
Matt admits he collapsed my conditional argument and agnosticism into a position I never held. What remains of the critique built against it?
What Erik Svensson, Massimo Pigliucci, and Matthew David Segall reveal about the evidence for physicalism, the residual case for panexperientialism, and what each would have to do to progress.
Matthew David Segall, Karsten Jensen, and Jason Hoskins on science, philosophy, religion, consciousness, and what it takes for our ideas about reality to be wrong.
How excellent bioelectricity research becomes vulnerable to ideological appropriation when explanatory claims exceed the tests that support them.
Assessing Chalmers’s later work, competing accounts of consciousness, and whether claims about phenomenal experience generate discriminating predictions.
A close examination of Michael Levin’s response to criticism of Platonic space, with unanswered questions, alternative mechanisms, and explicit evidential burdens.